Abstract-Securing broadcast communication over sensor networks has become an important research challenge. Intuitively, broadcast communication has two important metrics: reliability and security. Though the reliability metric has drawn sufficient attention in the research community, the security metric has not. In this paper, we address both metrics with an emphasis on the former and address the Denial-of-Broadcast Message attacks (DoBM) in sensor networks. We propose a novel treebased model called the k-Parent Flooding Tree Model (k-FTM) and present algorithms for the construction of k-FTM. The proposed k-FTM is robust against DoBM. It enables the base station to detect DoBM very efficiently, even in the presence of a prudent adversary who focuses on remaining undetected by causing damage below the detection threshold. k-FTM is, to our best knowledge, the first fault-tolerant tree model that is both reliable and secure. Through simulations we confirm that our model achieves detection rates close to that of a static tree and a broadcast reliability close to that of blind flooding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadcasting has been one of the most important and widely used communication techniques for information dissemination, from heralding in ancient times to the current state-of-the-art communication networks. Broadcast communication, which forms the basis of all communication in wireless networks, operates in two phases: the broadcast phase and the acknowledgement phase and is vulnerable to attacks during either or both of these phases. It has two important metrics: security and reliability and unlike reliability, very few researchers have addressed the security metric [10] . In a one-to-all communication like broadcasting, where every broadcast originates from a single source, the only way for the source to ensure that all members have received the message is to have them acknowledge the message. From the system perspective, having all of the nodes in a network acknowledge every message is not a scalable solution. In large networks, this increases the network load causing a higher amount of collision and contention [2] , [12] . Consequently, if the detection threshold is not tuned to accommodate the right amount of natural loss, then the system will be coaxed to raise false alarms. False alarms result in unnecessary system downtime as well as wasted resources by executing countermeasures on a network free of attacks. The aforementioned problem can be addressed by using a technique like Secure Implicit Sampling (SIS) [10] in which only a subset of nodes are randomly sampled to acknowledge each message broadcast.
When a flooding tree model (FTM) is used for broadcasting, each compromised node will be, in effect, blocking the message to its entire subtree. This has both an advantage and a disadvantage for the system. The advantage is that when a large number of nodes are deprived of the message, the attacker can be immediately detected. The disadvantage is that the attacker can cripple a substantial portion of the network by compromising a single node with a large subtree. For this reason, fault tolerance has been a major concern in flooding tree-based broadcasting. This idea has been captured in Figure 1 (a) , where the sensor network is represented as a graph and BS stands for base station. The aforementioned drawback of FTM can be overcome by using blind flooding, in which each node rebroadcasts the message on receiving it for the first time. This ensures that even in the presence of malicious nodes, every node receives the message unless there is a partitioning of the network. However, the fault tolerance of blind flooding comes at the cost of redundant transmissions that may cause a serious problem, referred to as the broadcast storm problem [3] . This causes communication congestion and contention. Hence, in light of the above discussions, the tradeoff between reliability and redundancy is inevitable.
In this paper, we propose k-FTM, a novel k-parent flooding tree model which is robust against Denial-of-Broadcast Message attacks (DoBM) in sensor networks. Our main motivation in proposing k-FTM is to retain the high detection rate of FTM but at the same time achieve a reliability close to blind flooding. k-FTM is a variation of FTM, in which all nodes except those that are within the transmission range of the base station have exactly k parents. When k = 1, k-FTM represents the basic FTM. We have relaxed the k-parent constraint on nodes that are in the communication range of the base station since they are assured of message delivery. FTM, k-FTM for k = 2, and blind flooding have been depicted in Figures 2 (a) , (b), and (c) respectively.
In k-FTM, blind flooding is carried out once to construct the initial k-parent tree. All subsequent message broadcasts and acknowledgements flow along this tree. In Figure 1 a node, and the dotted lines indicate the ACK path. k-FTM is an excellent fault-tolerant model, and to our best knowledge, the first fault-tolerant tree model to be applied for securing broadcast communication in wireless sensor networks. Using k-FTM has a two-fold benefit to the system. First, the attacker's malicious intentions are thwarted, since the message is delivered to the blocked nodes by at least one of the k parents, assuming each node has at least one benign parent. Second, the attacker is very likely to be detected immediately since a compromised node's child nodes, if sampled, report to the base station on failing to receive k copies of the message. The base station maintains a malicious counter count i mal for each node i in the network to record its misbehavior. The base station also maintains a global counter, count glo , that records the overall level of misbehavior in a network. Subsequently we will show that our model is an optimum balance between FTM and blind flooding. Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) We propose k-FTM, a novel k-parent flooding tree model, that has a detection rate close to that of a static tree.
2) The proposed k-FTM is the first fault-tolerant tree model for securing broadcast communication in wireless sensor networks. 3) k-FTM is the first tree model that achieves broadcast reliability close to that of blind flooding with reduced redundant rebroadcasts. 4) We present algorithms for constructing the k-FTM. 5) We analyze our model and evaluate it through simulations.
II. RELATED WORK
Though researchers have addressed the problem of energyefficient and reliable broadcasting in wireless and sensor networks [1] , [3] , [6] , [8] , [9] , security issues have not been addressed adequately. In [3] , Ni et al have discussed several drawbacks of the classical flooding algorithm, including energy consumption and reliability. They have also proposed several schemes to reduce redundant rebroadcasts. In [4] , [6] , Lim and Kim show that finding an optimal flooding tree in an ad hoc wireless network is similar to the Minimum Connected Dominating Set (MCDS) problem and show the NP-completeness of the same. In [5] the Internal Node Based Broadcasting algorithm is presented where it is assumed that each node has knowledge of the geographical coordinates as well as the degree of all its neighbors. With this knowledge, it decides if a node is internal or not, and only internal nodes relay the broadcast message.
McCune et al [10] have proposed Secure Implicit Sampling (SIS) for the detection of denial of message attacks on sensor network broadcasts. In SIS, the base station encrypts the message in which it is encoded which nodes are required to acknowledge, and then broadcasts it. The adversary has no way of knowing a priori the subset of nodes that will be sampled during each round. On receiving the message, each node authenticates the message and, if required, sends back an acknowledgement (ACK). In each round, on receiving the ACK, the base station authenticates it and computes the ratio of received ACKs R i , to expected ACKs S i . If this ratio is below a certain threshold h, then the system raises an alarm. In [10] , the probability of the attacker remaining undetected varies with the location of the attacked node. It generally increases with the distance between the attacked node(s) and the base station. Therefore, when the ACK from a geographically far node is lost, there is a very high probability that the base station will attribute it to natural loss. Additionally, when fewer nodes are attacked the probability of sampled nodes being blocked decreases and so does the probability of the attacker's detection. We thus advocate the use of k-FTM, which is more sensitive to attacks due to the topology, in such scenarios.
III. k-FTM

A. k-FTM vs Blind Flooding
Though blind flooding is one of the most preferred and reliable methods for achieving network-wide broadcast, it has a few drawbacks that can pose serious problems, particularly if a network uses blind flooding for each message broadcast. In this subsection we compare and contrast k-FTM with blind flooding.
In blind flooding, each node receives n copies of the same message, where n is the number of neighbors. In a dense network this will result in very high redundancy. Where as in k-FTM, each node can receive up to a maximum of k copies of the message, one from each of its k-parents, and k can be as small as 2.
In blind flooding, each node re-broadcasts the message upon receiving it for the first time. So, in a network of N nodes, there will be N re-broadcasts. In k-FTM, only internal nodes rebroadcast the message on receiving it for the first time. So, in a network with N nodes of which M are leaf nodes, there will be only (N − M ) re-broadcasts. This results in substantial savings of communication bandwidth as well as energy for non-broadcasting nodes. For example, in Figure 1 (b), the network has 10 nodes, of which 7 are broadcasting and 3 are non-broadcasting with k = 2. This reduces the number of re-broadcasts by 30%. Note that k is a tunable parameter. Therefore, the redundancy can be varied depending on the application domain as well as security and reliability requirements.
B. Attacker Model and Assumptions
The attacker's sole motive is to block the broadcast message to as many nodes as possible. By attacking during the acknowledgement phase, the attacker is merely increasing the false alarm rate since the message would have already been delivered to the nodes. This does not benefit the attacker since it only increases the probability of his detection. Hence, the attacker attacks only during the broadcast phase. There may be other attacker models in which the adversary may attack during acknowledgement phase, but we do not address it in this paper. In k-FTM, the adversary will not attack during the initial tree setup phase because blocking the message during this phase will render him as a non-broadcasting node. Consequently, the adversary will not be able to induce any damage during the actual message broadcast. The attacker is external to the network and randomly chooses nodes and compromises them. He cannot compromise the base station, and can never restore a compromised node to its original configuration. Compromised nodes attack by not forwarding the message to their children. The attacker is not aware of the network topology which makes it more difficult for him to choose nodes for launching his attack. We consider only nonforwarding attacks in a dense static network. When sampled, a compromised node promptly acknowledges and never drops the acknowledgements of other nodes. There is a secure keymanagement protocol to establish pair-wise keys between each node and the base station. ACKs are encrypted using the pairwise key. Hence, compromised nodes cannot inject fabricated ACKs. We also assume that compromised nodes do not collaborate. Nodes have uniform transmission range and the rate of message propagation is uniform. Lastly, selective forwarding is not permitted in k-FTM.
C. Working of k-FTM
In k-FTM, after node deployment, the base station carries out an initial round of flooding with a Hello message. Upon receiving the Hello message for the first time, every node rebroadcasts it and waits until T imeout ACK occurs. If a node receives acknowledgements before the timeout, then it stores the ID of the acknowledging nodes in its child list and sets its state as broadcasting. Otherwise, it sets its state as nonbroadcasting. Each node, except 1-hop neighbors of the base station, also acknowledges as child to exactly k nodes from which it receives the Hello message and enters the ID of these nodes in its parent list. A node can choose its k-parents using different methods, which we will discuss later in this section. Once a node establishes all k-parents and T imeout ACK occurs, it sends a copy of its parent list and child list to the base station. During subsequent broadcast rounds, nodes respond only to nodes in their parent list and child list. The base station, on receiving the lists, carries out a simple sanity check going through the parent list and child list of all nodes. Note that the above proposed method is a distributed method. Similar results can be obtained using a centralized method in which the base station constructs the tree. Once k-FTM is constructed, the base station broadcasts encrypted messages using a technique like SIS, encoding in them which nodes are expected to acknowledge. On receiving the message, nodes determine if they are expected to acknowledge. If so, then they send back an ACK. The ACK can be sent along one or all of the k-parents depending on the permissible redundancy. Two methods exist for a node i to choose one or more nodes among its k-parents to send the ACK. In the first method, i randomly chooses one or more parents to send the ACK. In the second method, i uses a watchdog-based reputation system to monitor nodes in its parent list. Then, based on the accumulated reputation value, i can choose one or more parent nodes to send the ACK. Any existing reputation monitoring system, like the Beta distribution system, can be used for this purpose. The ACK of a node contains a k-bit field. A binary 1 in these k-bits indicates that the corresponding parent forwarded the message, and a 0 otherwise. If none of the k-parents of the sampled node i forward the message, then the base station will fail to receive an ACK from that node. In this scenario, the base station first checks parent list i . It then checks to see if other sampled nodes have reported against the nodes in parent list i in their ACK. If there are no reports, then it is very likely that the node has either failed or the ACK has been lost enroute due to contention/collision. But if there are reports, say against a node j that is in parent list i , then j s malicious counter count j mal is incremented and so is the global malicious counter count glo . When these counters exceed a pre-determined threshold, then the base station rebuilds the This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the ICC 2007 proceedings. Statei ← non-broadcasting; 8: end if 9: child listi ← ∅; 10: end for tree. Note that nodes can send ACKs even if they are not sampled. This is known as proactive acknowledgement. In this paper, we shall not focus on proactive acknowledgement since the overhead in proactive acknowledgement approaches that of blind flooding. Nonetheless, it is a very effective mechanism for achieving a high detection rate, and is on the agenda for our future work.
Below are three different methods for choosing the k parents during k-FTM construction such that the system throughput is maximized while keeping the detection rate as high as possible. We present formal algorithms for these methods and discuss them briefly. The first method is called the Fastest First k-parents. In this method, a node acknowledges as child to the first k nodes from which it receives the Hello message. This method has been formally presented in Algorithm 3. This is the simplest of the three methods proposed and has the least overhead.
The second method is called the Disjoint Path k-parents. In this method, a node receives a Hello message from all its neighbors along with path label until T imeout msg occurs. path label is a list of IDs of nodes through which the message has passed starting from the base station. Nodes that broadcast the message after T imeout msg are ignored during parent selection process. A node, while choosing its k-parents, chooses nodes with disjoint path label. The advantage of this method is that it augments system throughput significantly. However, a node may encounter a situation wherein it may not find all k parents with a disjoint path label. Under this circumstance, assuming that a node finds only m out of k parents with a disjoint path, it chooses the remaining (k−m) parents according to a first-come-first-served principle. Algorithm 4 formally presents this method. After choosing the k-parents, a node appends its ID to k unique path label received from the selected k-parents and then rebroadcasts it along with the message. Figure 2 (d) is an example of a 2-FTM where each node has 2 parents with disjoint paths to the base station. This method has a larger overhead in terms of both storage and communication. To reduce this overhead, we can have a node rebroadcast the message by appending its ID to only one unique path label from one of its parent's. This improved method is called the Improved Disjoint Path k-parents. In this paper, due to space limitations, we shall not discuss it further but we will look into it in our future work. while parent counti < k do 5: for (message) received from each neighbor j do 6: if message is fresh then 7: rebroadcast (message); 8: end if
9:
Update P arent List(i, j); 10: parent counti + +;
11:
Update Child List(j, i); The base station reconstructs the tree under three circumstances: (a) count Glo exceeds the threshold T hreshold Glo , (b) count i mal exceeds the node misbehavior threshold T hreshold mal , and (c) T imeout tree occurs. Prior to the reconstruction, the base station broadcasts a message informing nodes about the malicious node(s) so that they don't choose the malicious node(s) as one of their parents when k-FTM is reconstructed. There is a possibility that the warning message itself may be denied to nodes. However, this is not a major threat since child and parent nodes of the malicious node in the current tree can keep track of its misbehavior using a reputation system. The main purpose of broadcasting this message is to warn those nodes that are in the neighborhood of a malicious node but are not its parent or child in the current k-parent tree. These nodes are highly vulnerable to becoming the child node of such malicious nodes in the reconstructed tree by virtue of their locality. while !T imeoutmsg do 4: for (message, path label) received from each neighbor j do 5: if message is fresh then 6: Put (message, path label) in buffer;
7:
Put path labels in buffer; 9: end if 10: end for 11: end while 12: Choose max available parents with disjoint path label;
13:
Choose remaining parents on FCFS basis;
14:
add all k-parents to parent listi;
15:
for each parent j selected do
16:
Update Child List(j, i);
17:
Statej ← broadcasting;
18:
end for
19:
Append ID to k unique path labels received from the kparents and rebroadcast along with message; 20: end for
IV. DISCUSSION
The adversary's strategy changes with his motive and the degree of his conservativeness. He can be either extremely aggressive, inducing maximum damage over a short period of time, and get caught. Or, he can be very prudent, inducing minimal damage during each broadcast round, and remain undetected for extended periods of time. At all times, the adversary solely strives to maximize his reward, measured as the extent of damage caused to the system, by balancing the tradeoff between his aggressiveness and his expected survival time. The system, on the other hand, always aims at maximizing its performance with high detection rate by thwarting the adversary's attempt before he induces an irreparable damage to the network. However, there is an inevitable tradeoff between good performance and a high detection rate.
A good performance often comes at the cost of high communication overhead, high memory usage, and low detection rate. By opting to maximize the reliability, the system allows malicious nodes to persist in the network. This is because when reliability is the requirement, blind flooding suits best since the chances of every node receiving the message, even in the presence of malicious nodes, is very high due to redundant re-broadcasts. On the other hand, when a high detection rate is the requirement, FTM suits best. By using FTM to achieve a high detection rate, the system sacrifices its performance, since a single malicious node with a large subtree can cripple a substantial portion of the network. However, the proposed k-FTM, ∀k > 1, strikes an optimal balance between blind flooding and FTM.
If sampled nodes are blocked by the compromised nodes, then they fail to receive the broadcast message. Consequently, the base station will fail to receive their ACK. In an idealworld situation where there is no natural loss, the base station will attribute this loss to DoBM. But in a real-world scenario, where there is natural loss, the base station may attribute this loss to either natural loss or DoBM depending on various factors like network load, permissible natural loss in the network, etc. As k increases, our model approaches blind flooding and ensures a definite coverage. But at the same time the number of redundant rebroadcasts increases since, with an increase in k, the number of non-broadcasting nodes decrease.
Rebuilding the tree based on T imeout tree has a two fold advantage. First, it prevents a dormant adversary from getting familiar with the locality, thereby curtailing the damage it can cause in the future. Second, it ensures that nodes are moved around providing all nodes a fair chance of being both broadcasting and non-broadcasting node. On the other hand, rebuilding the tree when the malicious behavior exceeds a predetermined threshold renders a compromised node as a non-broadcasting node or at least tapers its node degree such that only a small subtree is rooted at it in the new k-FTM. This curtails the damage the adversary can cause in the subsequent message broadcast rounds.
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
The simulation has been carried out on custom JAVA simulator. All the simulations have been performed for varying numbers of sensor nodes, 1000, 1250, 1500, 1750, and 2000, deployed in a 500m×500m area. Statistics have been collected for 1000 iterations and averaged.
In Figure 3 (a) , the results for total number of nodes actually receiving the broadcast message in a FTM with varying percentages of malicious nodes has been presented. Similarly, in Figure 3 (b), we have presented the results for throughput in k-FTM where k = 2. We shall call this model 2-FTM. It is very clear from the graph that the throughput in 2-FTM reaches a maximum of about 97% with 5% malicious nodes and reaches a minimum of about 78% with 25% malicious nodes. On the other hand, in FTM, it reaches a maximum of 80% with 5% malicious nodes. Therefore, 2-FTM successfully achieves a significantly higher throughput when compared to FTM. This throughput is nearly as good as in blind flooding but with a reduced number of rebroadcasts. Figure 3 (c) is a comparison of system throughput with different transmission ranges. The system performs best with 100m range. However, at 100m the energy consumption will also be higher. We can see that it achieves good throughput even at 60m range. In Figure 3 (d) , we have plotted the results comparing percentage of nodes deprived against probability of detection. We have compared FTM and 2-FTM with the SIS model [10] . Both these models out-perform SIS in terms of probability of detection.
In Figure 4 (a), we have plotted the percentage of nonbroadcasting nodes against total number of nodes, varying k from 1 to 5. We can see that as k increases, the percentage of non-broadcasting nodes decreases. In Figure 4 (b), we have compared the number of reports received at the base station under different scenarios. We have considered a 5-FTM of 1000 nodes with 60m transmission range, and 10% malicious nodes. When sampled nodes are asked to report on receiving fewer than 2 copies, the base station receives a maximum of 2 reports. This number increases with the number of copies expected. We can see that when sampled nodes are asked to report if they fail to receive fewer than 5 copies, about 50% of the sampled nodes report. Finally in Figure 4 (c), we have compared the performance of different methods of construction of k-FTM with k = 3, with 60m transmission range and 10% malicious nodes. We see that Disjoint Path k-parents and Improved Disjoint Path k-parents have almost the same performance and achieve the best coverage.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed k-FTM, a novel k-parent Flooding Tree Model to efficiently address both reliability and security metrics of broadcasting in wireless sensor networks. k-FTM is very robust and efficient in detecting DoBM and to our best knowledge the first fault tolerant tree model. Our model has reliability close to blind flooding and a detection rate close to a static tree. We have also presented various methods with algorithms for constructing k-FTM. In our future work, we will investigate the correlation between the network topology and other attacks on wireless sensor network communication and do a more in-depth analysis and simulation of k-FTM.
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